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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
tive approach may preview a new clarity in jurisdictional analysis. In
future opinions the court should give explicit recognition to the relative
values of various due process factors. Such action would assure
greater predictability and promote orderly legal development.
Even without an explicit differentiation among due process factors,
Griffiths' sole reliance on the purposeful act may produce a significant
expansion of jurisdiction. The court may be saying that it need only
find some intentional course of conduct upon which an inference of
submission to jurisdiction may be rationally based.49 The court's
willingness to find such conduct in our integrated economy suggests a
more certain remedy for forum businessmen in their contract disputes
with foreign corporations.5"
A CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA FOR
LOITERING STATUTES?
Defendant was stopped on a public sidewalk by a police officer
and asked to identify himself and account for his presence. He re-
fused to comply with this request, and was arrested and charged with
disorderly conduct.' On appeal to the California District Court of
Appeals, the lower court's dismissal was reversed. Held: One who
loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without
apparent reason or business has no constitutional right to remain
silent when the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate
to a peace officer as a reasonable man that the public safety demands
49The Washington court expressed this notion while commenting on Gray v.
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Oliver
v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 845, 858, 425 P.2d 647, 655 (1967).
' Critics have suggested that exposure of businessmen to foreign suits will dis-
courage casual interstate commerce. See Fourth N.W. Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus.,
Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732, 736 (1961); Conn. v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d
250, 342 P.2d 871, 874 (1959); Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Non-
Residents in Our Federal System, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 196, 204-06 (1957). A more
likely inhibiting factor would be the uncertainty engendered by "essays in juris-
dictional analysis." Businessmen who can anticipate the legal consequences of for-
eign transactions are able to seek appropriate protection.
'The relevant portion of CAL. PEN. CODE §647(e) (West Supp. 1967) reads as
follows:
Every person who commits any of the following acts shall be guilty of disorderly
conduct, a misdemeanor:
(e) Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without ap-
parent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to account for
his presence when requested by any peace officer so to do, if the surrounding cir-
cumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety
demands such identification.
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that he identify himself. People v. Weger, 251 A.C.A. 663, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 661 (2d Dist. Ct. App., 1967), cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3280
(U.S. Jan. 15, 1968).
Out of nearly five million arrests in 1966, over one-hundred thou-
sand were for vagrancy.2 The present rationale3 behind vagrancy
statutes was stated in a 1947 District of Columbia decision: "A
vagrant is a probable criminal; and the purpose of the [vagrancy]
statute is to prevent crimes which may likely flow from his mode of
life."4 In a 1950 article criticizing this approach, Mr. Justice Douglas
stated a basic limitation in this area:
Arrests for suspicion are not countenanced by the Bill of Rights. The
fourth amendment allows arrests-as well as searches-only for "prob-
able cause".... Under our system the arrest is warranted not by what
the police discover afterwards but by what they knew at the time.5
Advocates of vagrancy statutes argue that there is a social need for
such legislation to prevent supposed incipient crime,' but draftsmen
face constitutional problems when they attempt to strike ". . . a bal-
ance between a person's interest in immunity from police interference
and the community's interest in law enforcement." 7 The principal
case sought to determine whether California Penal Code § 647(e)
struck such a balance in a constitutionally permissible manner.8
2 FEDERAL BUREAU Or INvEsTiGATIor, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (UNIFoRM
CRIME REPoRTS-1966) 110-11 (1967).
'For a discussion of the historical background of such statutes, see MODEL PENAL
CODE §250.12, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
"District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1947). See, Com-
ment, Criminal Penalties for Vagrancy-Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the
Eighth Amendment?, 18 W. REs. L. Rav. 1309, 1325 (1967).
'Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1, 13 (1960). For a
thorough discussion of the development and application of vagrancy laws, see Foote,
Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603 (1956).
'An example of the widespread use of vagrancy statutes to offset the difficulties
inherent in obtaining attempt convictions is State v. Grenz, 26 Wn. 2d 764, 175 P.2d
633 (1946) (vagrancy conviction of defendant caught in early stage of apparent at-
tempted chicken theft affirmed). But cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962).
People v. Machel, 234 Cal. App. 2d 37, 43, 44 Cal. Rptr. 126, 130 (1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1965).
Wording the balance in this way is question-begging because (1) a balance of all
of society against one individual is generally going to favor the social interest, and(2) the balance here really involves not just a perso)'s interest in immunity from
police interference but rather the community's interest in freedom of its citizens
from unwarranted police intereference.
'This note argues that, at least as far as the self-incrimination issue is con-
cerned, the United States Supreme Court has already struck a definitive balance in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and that a statute cannot now be justified
by attempting to strike a balance different from that achieved in Miranda. See text
p. 854 infra. However, if the balance were against some other constitutional interest,
a different question would be involved than the direct governmental-individual con-
frontation with which the fifth amendment is concerned.
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This note analyzes vagrancy statutes in terms of two constitutional
issues raised: 9 vagueness' ° and self-incrimination. The attempt to
separate culpable from non-culpable loitering has proved futile in
some statutes attacked for vagueness." Recent statutes seek to cir-
cumvent this problem be defining vagrancy in terms of failure to
explain one's presence in certain circumstances rather than in terms
of loitering conduct itself. But this new approach raises problems
of self-incrimination. While the California statute successfully meets
the vagueness challenge, this note argues that it is still unconstitu-
tional as an abridgment of the privilege against self-incrimination. 2
'Although there might be both undifferentiated due process and equal protection
problems with such legislation, these are not presented in W4'eger. From the limited
authority, it does seem clear that prohibition of a class of persons from the public
thoroughfares in certain circumstances is constitutionally permissible provided that
this prohibition does not exceed the bounds of reasonableness, i.e., it must be
reasonably related to a legitimate state or municipal concern. Thistlewood v. Trial
Magistrate for Ocean City, Worcester County, 236 Md. 548, 204 A.2d 688, 693
(1964), and cases cited therein.
The limiting factor, Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial District, 148 Cal.
App. 2d 419, 306 P.2d 601, 605 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1957), is that
the general right of every person to enjoy and engage in lawful and innocent
activity while subject to reasonable restriction cannot be completely taken away
under the guise of police regulation. Any regulation to the contrary will be
stricken down as an arbitrary invasion of the inherent personal rights and liber-
ties of all citizens.
See also City of Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 383, 423 P.2d 522, 524 (1967).
"0 For an excellent discussion of this type of constitutional attack, see Note. The
T4bid-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
" Once a detention or "stop" is made under a statute such as that in the principal
case, there are only two ways in which police officers can investigate the stopped
person: by questioning or by searching. For the purposes of this note, the search
alternative is not considered under the general heading of vagrancy statutes, since
issues raised by such a search are more appropriate to so-called "stop and frisk"
statute cases. See Sibron v. New York, 18 N.Y. 2d 723, 220 N.E. 2d 805, 274 N.Y.S
2d 161 (1966), prob. juris, noted, 386 U.S. 954 (1967) (No. 1139, 1966 Term; renum-
bered No. 63, 1967 Term); Terry v. Ohio, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966),
cert. granted, 387 U.S. 929 (1967) (No. 1161, 1966 Term; renumbered No. 67, 1967
Term).
If these cases result in a holding that the act of stopping a "suspicious" person
violates the fourth amendment's search and seizure provisions, this would render
moot the entire subject of whether vagrancy ordinances of the California form are
either vague or contrary to the self-incrimination privilege, since the initiating
conduct of the police officer in such statutes-the stopping-would be invalid. Com-
pare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (evidence obtained by searches and seizures
in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in a state court) with Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (at least in federal prosecutions, testimonial evi-
dence of the accused following an unlawful arrest or search must be excluded as the
"fruit" of the unlawful police conduct).
A vagrancy statute drafted in terms of the loitering conduct itself is vague because
(1) it is almost impossible to sort out lawful from unlawful loitering on the basis
merely of objective appearances, and (2) if the separation is made on the basis of a
dichotomy between lawful and unlawful purpose (cf. City of Portland v. Goodwin,
infra note 20.), not only is the definitional problem great, but no effective standards
are apparent for guiding the policemen. This approach comes very close to statutory
justification for arrests on suspicion.
The fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to the
states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
[ VOL. 43 : 821
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VAGUENESS
"Vagueness" may encompass at least two discrete problems: (1)
clarity-does the statute convey sufficiently definite warnings; 3 and
(2) overbreadth--does the statute strike so broadly as to proscribe
non-culpable behavior.'4 Related to both is the problem of limiting
police discretion.'
The Weger court concluded that the statute was sufficiently clear
to enable a citizen to guide his conduct. Citing Roth v. United
States,'" the court argued that although loitering is difficult to define,
lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due pro-
cess.... [T]he Constitution does not require impossible standards; all
that is required is that the language conveys sufficiently definite warnings
as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding
and practice.17
The court reasoned that the requirement of precision must be mea-
sured "in the light of the objective sought to be achieved by... [the]
statute as well as the evil sought to be averted,"' and concluded that
"the words 'loiter"and 'wander' are not so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at their meaning and differ as to
" See, e.g., Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
"See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
"See id.; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
Of course, every criminal statute vests considerable discretion in the police, in the
sense that they may enforce the statute selectively. The typical constitutional attack
on this type of statute would be an equal protection attack on the statute as applied.
But that type of discretion is distinguishable from discretion vested in the police
which goes to the very issue of culpability.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
'7 People v. Weger, 251 A.C.A. 663, 59 Cal. Rptr. 661, 665 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
quoting from Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957).
2159 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
Apparently, the court was referring to the high degree of deference generally given
to important governmental interests which are difficult to further through any but
imprecise language. See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913) (criminal sanc-
tions of Sherman Act (26 Stat. 209 (1890) upheld against vagueness objections);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Smith Act convictions (18 U.S.C. 11(1946)) upheld against vagueness objections); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States,
342 U.S. 337 (1952) (conviction for violation of I.C.C. regulation (49 C.F.R. §
197.1(b)) about permissible highway routes for vehicles transporting inflammables or
explosives upheld against vagueness objections). The case relied on by the court,
Roth v. United States, supra note 16, was a consolidation of two cases. Alberts v.
California, the companion case, originated in a state prosecution. The act of consol-
idation and joint affirmance of the convictions in Roth indicates that this deference
to governmental interest is also paid to state governmental interests.
In the Weger context, the court begs the question of important governmental
interest because its unsupported belief that loitering must be proscribed is the basis
for allowing this "evil" to be made illegal in statutory language which is imprecise.
This circular approach could be used to justify vague language in any case, simply
by labeling the conduct in question as "evil."
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their application."1" Section 647(e) differs from older vagrancy stat-
tutes because it does not proscribe all loitering, but only loitering
and refusing to offer an explanation when the objective circumstances
make such questioning by a police officer reasonable. Because of this,
there is no need to become enmeshed in elaborate definitions of loiter
and wander. 2° The criminality of the conduct will depend not upon the
scope and clarity of those terms, but rather upon the reasonableness
of the questioning by the police under the objective circumstances. 2
The Weger court further concluded that introduction of this
reasonable man limitation saved the constitutionality of the statute
by limiting police discretion. 2 ' The United States Supreme Court,
focusing on the issue of discretion, found a Louisiana breach of the
peace statute unconstitutionally broad and uncertain in 1965. ' In
his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Black stated:
" Cal. Rptr. at 667.
'To avoid the pitfall of vagueness, a statute must be reasonably clear and certain.
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). In light of the em-
phasis in this statute on failure to identify and account for oneself, the court placed
too much emphasis on the meanings of the words "loiter," "wander," and "to ac-
count." Lay meanings of these terms afford sufficient clarity and certainty for con-
stitutional purposes.
In the context of § 6 4 7 (e), it is clear that the meaning of "to account" is simply to
explain why bne is present; there is no added statutory language which requires that
the explanation be of one type or another. Thus, an explanation in terms of being
present just to enjoy the evening, or to take a relaxing walk, would be enough to
satisfy the statute.
It may be impossible to find definitions of the above words which will constitu-
tionally sort out culpable from nonculpable "loitering." To take the court's finding
that the act of loitering itself must reveal some sinister purpose is suspect. The
Washington Supreme Court was not willing to take this course in the case of City of
Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 383, 423 P.2d 522 (1967). The court reversed de-
fendant's conviction for violation of a loitering ordinance (SEATTLE, WASH., CODE
§ 12.11.290(1967) which read:
It shall be unlawful for any person wandering or loitering abroad, or abroad
under other suspicious circumstances, from one-half hour after sunset to one-half
hour before sunrise, to fail to give a satisfactory account of himself upon the
demand of any police officer.
Compare City of Portland v. Goodwin, 187 Ore. 409, 210 P.2d 577 (1949). In that
case the Oregon Supreme Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting loitering during
certain hours unless the loiterer had and disclosed to a police officer a lawful pur-
pose. There was no such limitation of lawful purpose in the Seattle ordinance.
"The statute apparently attempts to create a watered-down "probable cause" for
questioning, as opposed to arrest. See note 11 supra. Thus, the focus of attention on
police discretion deprives the pejorative "loiter" of any definitional force.
2'59 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
The 1961 modernization of the statute was due in large part to the work of Pro-
fessor Sherry of the Law School of the University of California at Berkeley. See
his influential article: Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and agabonds-Old Concepts in
Need of Revision, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 557 (1960).
'Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). This case arose from a civil rights
demonstration in Baton Rouge, where police ordered the demonstrators to desist and
to remove themselves from the area. The police acted under a broad statute (LA.
REV. STAT. § 14.103.1 (Cum. Supp. 1962)) which prescribed no definite standard to
guide police authority in such situations.
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... Louisiana has by a broad, vague statute given policemen an unlimited
power to order people off the streets, not to enforce a specific, nondis-
criminatory state statute forbidding patrolling and picketing, but rather
whenever a policeman makes a decision on his own personal judgment
that views being expressed on the street are provoking or might provoke
a breach of the peace. Such a statute does not provide for government
by clearly defined laws, but rather for government by the moment-to-
moment opinions of a policeman on his beat.24
This language was later relied upon in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham5
where defendant was charged with obstructing a sidewalk and refusing
to move on after being requested to do so by a police officer.2
Speaking for the Court in reversing defendant's conviction, Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart said:
Literally read, therefore, the second part of this ordinance says that a
person may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only at the whim
of any police officer of that city. The constitutional vice of so broad a
provision needs no demonstration. 27
In spite of its shortcomings, the reasonable man standard meets
constitutional objections of vagueness by establishing an effective
limitation on police discretion." Under such a statute, police are
aware that checks to their authority exist, and that a "good faith"
suspicion is not a valid basis to detain and question.2 9 Although as
a practical matter few persons detained and questioned under the
statute would be aware of its form, the "reasonable man" standard
at least is designed to allow a person stopped by the police to use
his judgment about the propriety of the detention at that time and
to construct a legal defense later. Accused, at the time of detention,
and his counsel later at trial, may always inquire whether the arresting
officer was reasonable in concluding from the facts immediately prior
2Id. at 579.
-382 U.S. 87 (1965).
'Defendant was convicted on a general verdict of violation § 1142 of the BIR-
2IINGHAM, ALA., Code:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... to so stand, loiter or walk upon any street
or sidewalk in the city as to obstruct free passage over, on or along said street
or sidewalk. It shall also be unlawful for any person to stand or loiter upon any
street or sidewalk of the city after having been requested by any police officer to
move on.
7382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965).
'But see note 11 supra about the effect on the fourth amendment issues of this
reading of the statute.
' These checks would inhibit the "stop and question" conduct, since the possibil-
ity of a later judicial scrutiny of an arrest under the state would give an arresting
officer pause.
1968]
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to the detention that "the public safety demands that... [the accused]
identify himself."3
Statutes which allow police discretion greater than that of § 647(e)
run the risk of being declared unconstitutionally vague and uncertain.
Thus, to draft a vagrancy statute which overcomes vagueness objec-
tions, one should not define the proscribed conduct in terms of loiter-
ing itself," but rather in terms of failure to account for oneself in
carefully defined circumstances. -
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The other basis of the defendant's argument in the principal case
was that to impose criminal liability for refusal to answer police in-
quiries constituted a violation of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. 3 The Weger court rejected defendant's self-incrimination argu-
ments, but its reasoning was unsatisfactory.
This is the language of CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(e) (West Supp. 1967).
The thrust of the preceding analysis is applicable to § 250.6 of the MODEL PENAL
CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962), notwithstanding the endorsement by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court of this provision in dictum in City of Seattle v. Drew, 70
Wash. Dec. 2d 383, 423 P.2d 522 (1967). See note 20 supra. § 250.6 reads as follows:
A person commits a violation if he loiters or prowls in a place, at a time, or in
a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that war-
rant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity. Among the cir-
stances which may be considered in determining whether such alarm is war-
ranted is the fact that the actor takes flight upon appearance of a peace officer,
refuses to identify himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any
object. Unless flight by the actor or other circumstances makes it impracticable,
a peace officer shall prior to any arrest for an offense under this section afford
the actor an opportunity to dispel any alarm which would otherwise be war-
ranted, by requesting him to identify himself and explain his presence and con-
duct. No person shall be convicted of an offense under this Section if the peace
officer did not comply with the preceding sentence, or if it appears at trial that
the explanation given by the actor was true and, if believed by the peace officer
at the time, would have dispelled the alarm. (Emphasis added).
The use of the critical word "among" in the second sentence relating to determin-
ing if the penal provision is "triggered" clearly implies that other circumstances
unknown to a citizen may be employed by the policeman in his determination of the
legality of the individual's conduct. Putting aside the self-incrimination issue (an-
other fatal defect of the Model Penal Code provision, for the same reasons discussed
infra in the "Self-Incrimination" section of this note), close analysis of § 250.6 sug-
gests that it may be unconstitutionally vague because the provision does not clearly
specify what conduct is proscribed but leaves this determination to the individual
policeman on his beat. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) snpra at note 23 and
text accompanying.
"' See note 11 supra.
32 Id.
'The California court rejected one aspect of defendant's self-incrimination argu-
ment by reasoning that "[tlhe privilege against self-incrimination applies to evi-
dence of 'communications or testimony' of the accused, but not to 'real or physical
evidence' derived from him." 59 Cal. Rptr. at 672, citing to People v. Ellis, 65 Cal.
2d-, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 386 (1966). The court took the position that the
conduct involved here (silence) ". .. is mere nonassertive conduct; it is not a declar-
ation but a failure to offer an explanation under circumstances which call for one."
[ VOL. 43 : 821
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The purpose and concern of the fifth amendment privilege is set
out in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission:
[The privilege against self-incrimination] ... reflects many of our
fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to
subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense
of fair play... ; ... and our realization that the privilege, while some-
times a shelter to the guilty, is often a protection to the innocent. (cita-
tions omitted).34
Prior to Miranda v. Arizona,3 the "compulsion" required to violate
the self-incrimination privilege usually meant exercise of contempt
power.3" Only a body invested with such power could "compel" testi-
mony, and the privilege protected witness or defendant against exer-
cise of this power when testimony might be incriminating, unless of
course, the privilege was waived." Where power to compel was lack-
ing, questions regarding the privilege could not arise.3" Section 647 (e)
effectively extends the power to "compel" testimony to police on the
beat; it might be characterized as a "contempt of police" statute.
Id., citing to People v. Wilson, 238 Cal. App. 2d 447, 456, 48 Cal. Rptr. 55, 61 (ist
Dist. Cit. App., 1965).
In reaching this conclusion, the court cited Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757(1966), where evidence of analysis of the defendant's blood taken over his objection
by a physician after an arrest for drunken driving was held admissible despite fifth
amendment self-incrimination objections; "[T]he privilege protects an accused only
from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature." 384 U.S. at 761.
This distinction has no relevance in Weger. There is no basis for treating
silence (nonassertive conduct) as real evidence a la Schmerber. People v. Wilson,
the case used to ground this treatment of silence, is pre-Miranda, and there is lan-
guage in Miranda directly contrary to the approach taken by the California court in
Wilson:
[I]t is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution
may not.., use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in
the face of the accusation.
384 U.S. at 469 n.37.
Of course, Schnnerber made reference by way of dictum to the valid requirement of
voice exemplars. While this requirement means a defendant can be required to
speak, it is clear that this requirement does not extend to affirmative expression of
self-incriminating communication, since such information is squarely within the
privileged area of testimonial or communicative evidence, not "real evidence."
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
"384 U.S. 436 (1966), discussed infra p. 853. In Miranda, the Court found a cer-
tain type of factual setting to be compulsive per se, broadening substantially the
coverage of the privilege.
' Confessions which were produced by physical or psychological coercion, rather
than by threat of legal sanction, were attacked on due process grounds. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
'See generally 8 J. WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2276 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
" See note 37 supra.
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It would seem anomalous indeed if the protections of the fifth amend-
ment against self-incrimination should allow a person to stand mute
before a judge or legislator, but not before a policeman. 9
The Supreme Court recently restated the sweep and breadth to be
accorded the privilege:
It is true that the statement of the privilege [against self-incrimination]
in the Fifth Amendment... is that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case (Court's emphasis) to be a witness against himself." How-
ever, it is also clear that the availability of the privilege does not turn
upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon
the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it in-
vites.
40
Under § 647(e), the defendant is required to make potentially in-
criminating statements. To remove fifth amendment objections, it
would be necessary to assert that nothing a § 647 (e) defendant would
say could create a "real and appreciable danger" of incriminating
him.4 But such an assertion is false with respect to guilty defendants
or those likely to be prosecuted wrongfully on the basis of their testi-
mony. There is no practical way to separate these defendants from
the remainder of defendants, nor does the statute, as construed, at-
tempt to do so.
When the danger of self-incrimination is not "imaginary and unsub-
stantial, 4 2 the issue is raised: who decides whether the defendant may
invoke the privilege? Since Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in United
States v. Burr4 in 1807, it has been settled that this judgment rightly
belongs to defendant. To sustain § 647(e) is, in effect, to remove de-
fendant's right to invoke his privilege and give that right to the police-
man.44 A more direct abridgment of the privilege is hard to imagine.J'
" In 1+4eger, there is no possibility of a "waiver" argument, since defendant ex-
pressly attempted to invoke the privilege, and refused to explain his conduct.
[n re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967) (emphasis added). See concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice White in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964),
quoted with approval In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 47.
" Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 (1896).
42" Id.
25 Fed. Cas. 38, (No. 14,692E) (C.C.D.Va. 1807).
" Here, defendant is not allowed to judge what answers may incriminate him,
and no immunity is provided to him. It would be anomalous for a court to uphold
the statute by excluding any testimony relating to a substantive crime admitted in
response to the § 647(e) questions, since a major legislative purpose to elicit just
such information underlies such statues. Cf. Marchetti v. United States, 36 U.S.L.W.
4143, 4149 (U.S. Jan. 29, 1968); Grosso v. United States, 36 U.S.L.W. 4150, 4152
(U.S. Jan. 29, 1968).
" Cf. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (conviction of police officers
for conspiracy to obstruct justice on basis of confession resulting from statutory
choice between self-incrimination or job forfeiture reversed because confessions
[ VOL. 43 : 821
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The situation in which defendant found himself is so analogous to
Miranda" that the full Miranda safeguards should be applied,4 7 yet
the Weger court denied that Miranda was even relevant. In that case
the United States Supreme Court held:
the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpa-
tory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination.48
Anticipating the obvious question, the Court went on to state that:
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law en-
forcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or other-
wise reprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.49
The question is how the word "significant" is to be evaluated in
the context of Miranda. There are two approaches to this definitional
problem: (1) "significant deprivation of freedom of action" may be
defined by balancing the social interest in individual freedom from
police questioning against the social need for the deprivation in any
particular instance, or (2) a "significant deprivation" may be defined
were coerced, not voluntary); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (refusal of
attorney to produce demanded financial records or to testify at judicial inquiry on
grounds of the privilege aginast self-incrimination was not a valid basis for dis-
barment). These cases were cited in the Weger dissent; 59 Cal. Rptr. at 676 n.2. See
also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
"384 U.S. 436 (1966).
,7 For reference to the Miranda "safeguards," see note 48 infra.
Even if the Miranda warnings were given, there would be difficulties, since either
(1) the effect would totally vitiate the purpose of § 647(e) since no information
would be forthcoming, or (2) if defendant were still arrested for his silence, fourth
amendment problems would be raised squarely. See note 11 supra. Moreover, it is
impermissible to draw inferences of guilt (or probable cause) from such silence.
See Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
The differences in the character of the privilege against self-incrimination ac-
corded a ulitness and an accused (see generally 8 J. WimoGRE, EVIDENCE § 2276 (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961)) are of no concern here, since §647(e) is a clear instance of
the accused's privilege.
"384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added). This is the explicit holding of the case, but
other language is broader in its sweep. The three main "safeguards" provided under
Miranda are warnings to the defendant that (1) he has a right to remain silent, (2)
that anything he hays may be used against him later, and (3) that he has an immediate
right to counsel, which will be provided for him if he cannot afford to hire his own.
'DId. In footnote 4 on the same page, the Court states: "This is what we meant
in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused."
(The reference is to Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)). In light of this
explanation or definition, the dichotomy in Escobedo between the accusatory and
general investigatory stages is no longer relevant as the determinant of the moment
when the constitutional safeguards here discussed become operative and controlling.
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exclusively in terms of certain unassailable rights of the individual
vis-a-vis the powers of government. 5
The court in the principal case found support for the social balance
test in the following language in Miranda:
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of po-
lice officers in investigating crime. When an individual is in custody on
probable cause, the police may... seek out evidence in the field to be
used at trial against him. Such investigation may include inquiry of
persons not under restraint. General on-the-scene questioning as to facts
surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-
finding process is not affected by our holding.51
A careful reading of this language, 2 however, shows that the police
freedom to investigate is only applicable to persons "not under re-
straint." Thus, persons under restraint do not fall within that aspect
of police investigation "not affected by our holding." Miranda replies
explicitly to advocates of social balancing:
The whole thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Con-
stitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with
the power of government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that
an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. That
riqht cannot be abridged.53
Thus, the Court in Miranda has already struck what it regarded as
the appropriate social balance. This balance must control over any
attempt by government to strike a different balance abridging these
Miranda-protected rights.
Applying this analysis to Weger, the defendant could not simply tip
his hat to the questioning officers and walk on-if he had, he would
have been arrested for not complying with § 647 (e). When arrest can
only be avoided by remaining on the spot, there has been a consider-
able restraint of defendant's freedom of action. Miranda leaves no
doubt that for the purpose of determining when an accused's fifth
' What this language actually means is that a "right" has been defined by a
balance already struck, and that "right" is no longer open to ascertainment by further
balancing.
" 384 U.S. at 477 (emphasis added).
" Note that all the exceptions allowing questioning on the spot of an actual crime
are centered on a certain past act, and not on a specific individual with reference to
a future act. The questioning under a loitering ordinance is a prime example of
questioning a person on suspicion.
' 384 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added).
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amendment privilege against self-incrimination becomes effective, a
restraint by police officers is a significant deprivation of freedom of
action, which in turn is one of the definitions of "custodial interroga-
tion." The police restraint of defendant in the principal case was a
sufficient deprivation to render Miranda applicable. To administer
the statute constitutionally, Miranda warnings should be given. But
use of these warnings, 4 or exclusion of testimony when they are not
used, will vitiate the purposes of the statute: to elicit information of
incipient crime and to allow arrest in circumstances where objective
conduct does not yet constitute attempt 5
CONCLUSION
California Penal Code § 647 (e) cannot be reconciled with the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, because (1) the threat of penal sanc-
tions cannot be used to compel self-incriminating testimony, and
(2) Miranda clearly requires the giving of warnings prior to question-
ing which are not provided for in the statute, and which would, if
given, vitiate the objective of the statute.
Thus, any loitering statute is faced with a constitutional dilemma.
To avoid the dangers of vagueness, the statute should focus on failure
to account for oneself in certain circumstances; yet, to respect the
privilege against self-incrimination, the statute must focus on loitering
conduct itself. Loitering ordinances of either type are constitutionally
suspect.
See note 48 supra.
= See note 6 supra.
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